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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE LAND BOARD
Appella;n.t

-vs.-

UTAH STATE FINANCE
COMMISSION

Case
No. 9354

Respondent

BRIEF OF APPELLANT'

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Utah's 1959 legislature authorized investment of not
to exceed 50% of the Permanent School Fund moneys in
corporate securities meeting statutory standards of quality (Section 65-1-65, U. C. A. 1953 as amended 1959). Respondent refused to issue checks for the purchase of
authorized securities on the ground that the purchase of
corporate securities was unconstitutional.
1
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This is an action commenced under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act. Appellant sought a declaration
from the lower court as to its rights and authority under
Section 65-1-65 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1959, in view
of the provisions of Section 31, Article VI and Section 7,
Article X of the Utah Constitution. It was the judgment
of the lower court that the statute in question violated
Section 31, Article VI and was invalid to the extent it
permitted investment of school funds in corporate securities. No declaration was made as to the effect of Section
7, Article X on plaintiff's investment activity, and the
only issue before this court on this appeal is the propriety
of the lower court's construction of Section 31, Article VI,
which reads as follows :
''Sec. 31 (Lending public credit forbidden)
The Legislature shall not authorize the State,
or any city, county, town, township, district or
other political subdivision of the State to lend its
credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or
corporate enterprise or undertaking.''

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT

I

TI-IE PURCHASE OF CORPORATE SECURITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTE IS
NOT A LENDING OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT
IN AID OF THE CORPORATION WHOSE SECURITIES ARE PURCHASED.
2
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PoiNT

II

THE PURCHASE OF CORPORATE SECURITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTE
IS NOT A SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK OR
BONDS IN AID OF A CORPORATE ENTERPRISE OR UNDERTAKING.

PoiNT

III

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS MUST BE
SUSTAINED UNLESS CLEARLY IN VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

THE PURCI-IASE OF CORPORATE SECURITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITI-I STATUTE IS
NOT A LENDING OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT
IN AID OF THE CORPORATION WHOSE SECURITIES ARE PURCHASED.
The principal proscription of Section 31, as indicated
by the title, is against lending the public credit. This is
a common kind of constitutional provision which has had
frequent judicial scrutiny. Corpus Juris Secundum treats
the generic provision at page 1167 of Volume 81. Beginning on page 1168, the editors say:
"In order to constitute a violation of the constitutional provision, it is essential that there be an imposition of liability directly or indirectly on the
state, and unless the credit or faith of the state is
obligated there is no violation. The giving or lend3
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing of credit of the state prohibited by the Constitution occurs only when such giving or lending results in creation by the state of a legally enforceable obligation on its part to pay one person an
obligation incurred or to be incurred in favor of
that person by another person.''
In Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121
Colo. 521, 218 P. 2d 498, therefore, the Colorado court held
that a statute authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds
did not pledge or lend the state's credit because there
could be no call by the bondholders upon the general funds
of the state. In Commissioners of Bladen County v.
Boring, 95 SE 43, on the other hand, a statute authorizing
the County to guarantee road bonds of townships within
the County was lield, by the North Carolina Court, to
violate a constitutional provision prohibiting counties
from lending their credit.
It is clear from the texts and cases that a loan of
the state's credit can only occur when the state enters into
such a relationship that it must pay another's debt if he
does not. The purchase of corporate securities does
not create a relationship of the proscribed kind. The
owner of a corporate bond or stock certificate has no obligation to the creditors of the issuing corporation by virtue of that ownership. A bondholder is himself a preferred creditor. A stockholder has some claim upon the
assets of the corporation (Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, § 8224) and no personal responsibility to its
creditors (Section 16-2-13 U.C.A. 1953; 18 C.J.S. 1306).
Even if it could be contended that Appellant's purchase of corporate securities somehow lent the public
4
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credit, such purchases would still be proper and constitutional unless they were also "in aid of" the corporation.
The Virginia Court had occasion to discuss the meaning
of a provision similar to Utah's in Holston Corporation v.
Wise County, 131 Va. 142, 109 S.E. 180. In that case, the
county entered into a contract with a corporat'ion by
which the corporation agreed to furnish gravel at a specified price to any contractor building county roads, and
the county guaranteed payment. The Court said such
a contract did not grant the credit of the county ''in aid
of" the contractors unless the contractors could not have
obtained gravel on their own cr~dit or made a greater
profit by getting a reduced price because of the pledge
of the county credit. Many cases have held that whether
or not an action which might lend public credit was in aid
of a private individual depends on the animating purpose of the public officials. (See annotation which appears at 87 ALR 168) The purpose of purchases made
in accordance with Section 65-1-65 would be to improve
the investment position of the Permanent School Fund,
not to aid corporations.
The question of whether a purchase of corporate
bonds offended the ''credit clause'' was squarely before
the Virginia Court in .Almond v. Day, 197 V a. 792, 91 S.E.
2d 667. It held a statute authorizing the purchase of
corporate securities was constitutional and did not offend
the credit clause of the Virginia Constitution. In particular the court said, beginning at page 667 :
"Use of the State's funds for purchase of securities for the State's benefit is not an extension
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of "credit" which poses any threat to the finan.
cial security or welfare of the State. Extending
its credit to aid and promote private enterprise
was the evil from which the State had suffered
financially. The potential danger incurred in
lending credit to foster and promote the interests
of those who had no rightful claim, in justice or in
morals, to the State's help or relief was the evil to
be arrested. When the underlying and activating
purpose of the transaction and the financial obli·
gation incurred are for the State's benefit, there
is no lending of its credit though it may have expended its funds or incurred an obligation that
benefits another. Merely because the State incurs
an indebtedness or expends its funds for its benefit
and others may incidentally profit thereby does
not bring the transaction within the letter or the
spirit of the 'credit clause' prohibition.''
POINT

II

THE PURCHASE OF CORPORATE SECURITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATUTE
IS NOT A SUBSCRIPTION TO STOCK OR
BONDS IN AID OF A CORPORATE ENTERPRISE OR UNDERTAKING.
The constitutional language which concerns us here
is that which forbids authorization ''to subscribe to stock
or bonds in aid of'' any corporate enterprise. If the
phrase "to subscribe to" is synonymous with the verb "to
purchase,'' a clear conflict between constitution and
statute must be recognized where, but only where, a purchase is attempted the activating purpose of which is
to "aid" a corporation. It is the appellant's contention that subscription is different from purchase and
that the framers of the constitution were concerned about

6
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a kind of evil which could proceed from subscription and
not from the kind of purchase authorized by Sec. 65-1-65.
Reference to the standard legal texts and dictionaries
clearly marks for us a distinction between'' subscribe to''
and ''purchase.'' Fletcher ( 4 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations 1372) devotes some seven pages to the distinction. It is certain that a subscription can only relate to
an original issue of stock and a direct transaction with
the issuing corporation or other subscribers.
In Guara;nty Mortgage Co. v. Wilcox, (218 P. 133;
62 U. 184) this Court noted the distinction between subscription and purchase and expressed the point of view
was undoubtedly in the minds of the constitutional draftsmen. The following language of the Pennsylvania Court
was cited with approval:
"It seems to us that there is a clear distinction
between a subscription agreement and a contract
for the purchase of stock. Subscribers, as generally
understood, are those who, upon the formation of
a corporation, agree mutually to take and pay for
the shares of the capital stock.''
Appellant could not, acting under the authority of
Section 65-1-65, enter into a subscription agreement because only securities of corporations having a five-year
dividend record can be purchased.
That some real difference between subscription and
purchase was recognized by the members of the constitutional convention is evident from the record of the con-

7
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vention proceedings. 1 At page 894 of Volume I of Proceedings Constitutional Convention, there begins the record of a long and heated debate on the proposal of Mr.
Roberts that the following section be added to the constitution's legislative article:
"Neither the State of Utah nor any political
subdivision thereof shall become a stockholder in
or loan its credit to nor make any appropriation
for the benefit of any person, company, association or corporation unless two-thirds of the qualified voters at a regular election to be held shall
assent thereto.''
It is obvious from the debate that this proposal represented the extreme limitation sought to he imposed upon
the legislature by members of the convention. Those who
believed the legislature should be permitted to exercise its
judgment in this area were at least as vocal and unquestionably more numerous since the proposal of Mr. Roberts was defeated (p. 928) and a motion for reconsideration failed (page 1002, Vol. II).
The further records of the convention do not include
discussion of the language which became Section 31 of
Article VI. It is significant, however, that Mr. Roberts'
proposal forbidding the State to "become a stockholder"
was rejected and a provision was accepted which prohibited only subscriptions to stock and bonds of private
corporations. The conclusion is inescapable that. there
was something about subscription not inherent in" becoming a stockholder'' which the convention found repulsive.
Proceedings of constitutional convention may be resorted to in
aid of construction and interpretation of constitutional provision
(Cooper v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 35 U 570, 102 P 202).

- -1
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There can be no question that the real issue in the
convention was whether or not the public credit should
be lent. Mr. Roberts, the proposer of the section, seemed
to claim no other objective for his proposal than the
avoidance of any pledge of the public credit, and the section heading would confine the scope of the prohibition
to action which would pledge the public credit. 2
1895, the year of the convention, was in the era of
frantic railroad construction. 3 It had been the practice
of the United States and some states to offer bounties, in
the form of land or money, to railroad companies for road
construction or to guarantee the payment of their debts.
Tennessee in particular had suffered severe losses, and
the Tennessee situation was pointed out, in the course of
the convention debate, as the evil to be avoided. The
activity which resulted in heavy public debt in Tennessee
is summarized in the 1926 edition of ''Moody's Governments'' beginning at page 1878. The historical summary
begins:
''Aid to companies in the construction of public
improvements was responsible for a large part of
the debt of Tennessee. 'An act to establish a system of internal improvements in this State' was
passed Feb.11, 1852 and provided that State bonds
to the extent of $8,000.00 per mile might be issued
and lent to turnpike and railroad companies-"
* * * * ''Before and immediately after the war
2 "In case of ambiguity in a statute, the title and headings may
-be resorted to as an aid in the ascertainment of the legislative intent."
(82 C. J. S. 731, Statutes § 350)
3 "Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, the courts will
take into consideration all the facts and circumstances existing at
t!Ie time of, leading up to its enactment, such as the history of the
times, contemporary customs, the state of the existing law, the evils to
be remedied, and the remedy provided." (82 C. J. S. 738, Statutes
§ 352)

9
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$27,678,000 state bonds were lent to railroad
companies.''
The evil seen by our convention lay in the lending of
credit to private corporations in this manner where the
state became obliged to pay the debt which was incurred
for and was the primary obligation of the railroad
companies.
There is a distinct kinship between a pledging of the
public credit in aid of a private corporation and a promise
by government to purchase shares of such a corporation
when organized. In both cases, the action of the government is promotional; the promise is given to induce investors to commit their money to an enterprise thought to
be in the public interest. In both cases, the promise is or
may be enforceable at the suit of the investors or the
creditors of the corporation. The motivation, the risk and
the mechanics are entirely different where corporate
securities are acquired with accumulated funds as a part
of an investment program calculated to increase the yield
from public funds and protect them from the depreciating
effects of economic inflation.
The constitutional convention was concerned that the
Legislature should not engage in promotional activities of
the kind specifically prohibited, that is - lending the
public credit or entering into subscription contracts. That
the state might become a stockholder in the course of a
planned investment program was not distasteful to the
members. They were opposed to the state's underwriting
enterprises in the nature of utility expansion by new

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

corporations without experience or solid financial foundation whether the underwriting was done by direct
guarantee or pre-incorporation subscription.
It is in this light that the court should construe the
language of Article VI, Section 31. There is abundant
logic and authority to support the view that investment
in well-established corporate securities with public funds
accumulated only for investment was never intended to
be prohibited. Such investment is in aid of the State,
not the corporation.

PoiNT III
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS MUST BE
SUSTAINED UNLESS CLEARLY IN VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL LAW.
The Court is undoubtedly aware of the principle of
constitutional law that the judicial effort should be to
sustain legislation, not to condemn it. The principle should
apply with special force where, as in this case, the legislation passed both houses without one dissenting vote.
This Court has been among the most eloquent in endorsing
the principle. In Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U 237, 48 P 2d
526, it said:
"in approaching the subject we have in mind
the rule that when an act of the Legislature is attacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the question presented is not whether it is possible to condemn the act, but whether it is possible to uphold
it. The presumption is always in favor of validity,
and legislative enactments must be sustained unless clearly in violation of fundamental law. * * * *
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Every presumption will be indulged in favor of
legislation and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference
with legislative action.''
To sustain the statute here in question, this Court
need only recognize the well-established distinction between subscription and other kinds of securities purchase
contracts, construe the ''credit clause'' as it has been
construed by other courts and understood by the writers,
or acknowledge that only activity primarily intended to
aid corporations is prohibited.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons:
1. Security purchases do not lend the public credit.
2. Security purchases authorized by Section
65-1-65 cannot be subscriptions.
3. Activity contemplated by Section 65-1-65 cannot be presumed to be ''in aid of'' corporations
rather than the state.
appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the judgment of the District Court herein and declare
Section 65-1-65 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 1959, to be constitutional, valid and operative.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN J. ALLEN
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Appellant
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